Abstract We study the fragmentation-coagulation, or merging and splitting, model as introduced in [16] , where N small players can form coalitions to resist to the pressure exerted by the principal. It is a Markov chain in continuous time and the players have a common reward to optimize. We study the behavior as N grows and show that the problem converges to a (one player) deterministic optimization problem in continuous time, in the infinite dimensional state space ℓ 1 . We apply the method developed in [8] , adapting it to our different framework. We use tools involving dynamics in ℓ 1 , generators of Markov processes, martingale problems and coupling of Markov chains.
front this pressure in an effective manner (but possibly imposing certain obligatory regulations for the members of the group). Analysis of such possibility leads one naturally to models of mean field enhanced coagulation processes under external pressure. The major player can change her strategy only in discrete deterministic time.
Coagulation fragmentation processes are well studied in statistical physics, see e. g. [19] . In particular, general mass exchange processes, that in our social environment become general coalition forming processes preserving the total number of participants, were analyzed in [13] and [14] with their law of large number limits for discrete and general state spaces. In the same way problems in economics, like merging banks or firms on the market, were studied in [21] and [22] . While an application to scientific citation networks or the network of internet links is discussed in [17] . Some simple situation of nonlinear Markov games on a finite state space was analyzed in [15] , proving the convergence of Nash-equilibria for finite games to equilibria of a limiting deterministic differential game.
Very recently, several authors have studied games of coalition formation. A notion of core equilibrium in proposed in [9] , and found via a fixed point method. An application to contracts and networks is analyzed in [10] . A study of the incentives offered by the government to municipalities to merge into larger groups is provided in [24] . Players preferences over winning coalitions are derived by applying strongly monotonic power indices on the game in [12] , where the author also investigate whether there are core stable coalitions . An application of systems of coalition formation to the climate change problem is discussed in [7] , where also numerical simulation are performed.
Here we are interested in the response of such systems to external parameters that may be set by the principal who has her own agenda. Thus we add to the analysis a major player fitting the model to a more general framework. There are two main difficulties in studying this model. Firstly the total number of coalitions is not constant in time, as they can merge or split. Secondly the dynamics both of the system of small players and of the limiting system are supposed to lie on the infinite dimensional space ℓ 1 , which can be viewed also as a space of measures, instead of a fixed R d . In fact the dimension of the state space for the system of coalitions grows as the number N of small players tends to infinity. If the system is in the state x ∈ ℓ 1 then x k = hn k where n k is the number of coalitions of size k and h is a suitable parameter depending on N, for instance the inverse of the initial number of coalitions.
Our main result is to show that this problem converges, as N grows, to a one player deterministic optimization problem in continuous time, in the infinite dimensional state space ℓ 1 , the so called mean field limit. We prove convergence of the value functions and provide also an approximated optimal policy for the system of small players. Such optimal policy is usually found by using dynamic programming for the finite horizon case, but this approach suffer from the curse of dimensionality, which makes them impractical when the state space is too large. Solving the HJB equation for the limiting system numerically is sometimes rather easy. It provides a deterministic optimal policy whose reward is remarkably close to the optimal reward.
We apply the method developed by Gast, Gaujal and Le Boudec in [8] , where the authors obtained the same kind of results , but in a different setting. They consider discrete time Markov chains as prelimit systems whose state space is finite and fixed. Their proofs are in line with classic mean field arguments and use stochastic approximation techniques. Moreover their approach is algorithmic: they construct two intermediate systems: one with a finite number of objects controlled by a limit policy and one with a limit system controlled by a stochastic policy induced by the finite system.
Several papers in the literature are concerned with the problem of mixing the limiting behavior of a large number of objects with optimization. In [5] , the value function of the Markov decision process (MDP) is approximated by a linearly parametrized class of functions and a fluid approximation of the MDP is used. It is shown that a solution of the HJB equation is a value function for a modification of the original MDP problem. In [23] , the curse of dimensionality of dynamic programming is circumvented by approximating the value function by linear regression. In [8] they use instead a mean field limit approximation and prove asymptotic optimality in N of limit policy. Actually, most of the papers dealing with mean field limits of optimization problems over large systems are set in a game theory framework, leading to the concept of mean field games, introduced by Lasry and Lions [18] and P.E. Caines, M. Huang and R.P. Malhamé [2] .
Notice finally that in this paper we analyze only a preliminary step for a full game setting with major and minor players, namely the response of the minor players to the action of the major one. The full analysis (not developed here) would include the reaction of the major on the behavior of the minor players and the search for the corresponding equilibrium. However, this development does not seem to present serious difficulty, since our analysis reduces it effectively to a two-player game: the major and the pool of small players.
Contribution and structure of the paper
In [16] Kolokoltsov shows the convergence of the optimization problems related to the system of small players to an optimization problem in discrete time for the limiting system (this will be similar to theorem 3). His proof is based on an argument that is focused on the generators of the Markov chains and shows their convergence. In this paper we want to show the convergence to an optimization problem in continuous time, so we apply the ideas from [8] where they used a completely different argument for the proof, focusing on trajectories and constructing two auxiliary systems.
In section 2 we describe properly the fragmentation coagulation model starting from [16] , the limiting system and the related optimization problems. We define the state space where all the dynamics considered lie, which is a compact set S ⊂ ℓ 1 , and in the end we state the assumptions we need to obtain the convergence. In section 3 we present our main results and define the two auxiliary systems. Then we show how to construct an approximated optimal policy starting from an optimal action function for the mean field limit. Moreover we consider a class of applications in which a particular choice of the rate functions allows to reduce the limiting problem to an optimization problem in one dimension, providing an explicit solution in a simplified case and a more effective numerical scheme in general. Finally in section 4 we complete the proofs, showing that the general requirements for convergence expressed in [8] can fit to our model, with some modification. We use theorems about semigroups and generators of Markov processes and related martingale problems. Moreover we apply the notion of coupling of Markov chains and also a particular Markovian coupling.
Model and assumptions

The space B + (L, R]
We denote, as usual, the space of measures
(1.1)
Denote by ℓ 1 + the space of positive measures on N:
which is a Banach space equipped with this norm. Let us denote by B(L, R) the ball of radius R in ℓ 1 (L), centered in 0, and ℓ
Lemma 1. The set B + (L, R) is relatively compact in the norm topology of ℓ 1 .
Proof. By Prohorov's compactness criterion a family of measures is relatively compact in the weak topology if and only if it is tight. We have ∑ k kx k < R for any x ∈ B + (L, R). Thus for any n ∈ N and any x ∈ B + (L, R)
which gives ∑ k≥n x k ≤ R n for any n ∈ N and any x ∈ B + (L, R). So for any ε > 0 there exists n ∈ N such that Evolutionary game of coalition building under external pressure   5 for all x ∈ B + (L, R), which means that the tightness condition is satisfied. By Schur's theorem, any weakly convergent sequence in ℓ 1 is actually convergent in the norm of ℓ 1 . Therefore the set B + (L, R) is relatively compact in the topology of ℓ 1 .
We denote by B + (L, R] the closure of B + (L, R) in the norm topology of ℓ 1 , which is compact in ℓ 1 , although not in the topology of ℓ 1 (L). The set
will be the state space for the dynamics considered.
We will assume that the functions defined on S have some regularity. Let Z be a closed convex subset of a normed space Y and
Thus the norms of the derivatives in Y are defined as norms of linear maps:
These are subsets of C (Z) and Banach spaces under the norms
We will use these definitions for the sets Z = S, which is convex and compact, and Y to be either
where n k ∈ N denotes the total number of coalitions of size k, so the total number of small players is N = ∑ k kn k and the total number of coalitions is ∑ k n k . The dynamics will be better described in the rescaled space
where h can be taken, for instance, as the inverse of the initial number of coalitions. We want to study the limit as h → 0. All this hN f in spaces, as h changes, can be viewed as subspaces of the space ℓ 1 . The total number of players is conserved: this motivates the choice of L(k) = k in the previous section, since ||x|| ℓ 1 (L) = hN for any state x; we will return to this in 2.5.1. The dynamics evolves in continuous time as a Markov chain. It is described as follows:
• to any randomly chosen pair of coalitions of size i and j is attached a random exponential clock of parameter hC i j (x, b) so that they merge if it rings; • to any randomly chosen coalition of size i is attached an exponential clock of parameter F i j (x, b) such that, if it rings, the coalition splits into two coalitions of size j and i − j .
Here the functions C and F may depend on the whole composition x and b is a control parameter which lies in a compact metric space (E, d).
The minimum of all these exponential random variables is an exponential random variable with the parameter
(1.8)
When this minimum clock rings, the system goes from the state n to either n − e i − e j + e i+ j (two coalitions merge) or n − e i + e j + e i− j (a coalition splits). The sequence (e i ) ∞ i=1 denotes the standard basis in R ∞ . The first case happens if the minimum holds for the clock of parameter hC i j (x, b), thus with probability given by
. While the second case happens with probability 
Equation (1.9) can be equivalently presented as the infinitesimal generator
of the Markov chain describing the system of small players on the space hN f in ⊂ ℓ 1 (N), for every G ∈ C (S).
Notation 1 X h (t, x, b) is the state (in S) at time t of the Markov Chain given by this generator (1.10) which is in x at t = 0, under the control parameter b given by the major player.
The process X h (t, x, b) describes the evolution of the coalitions of small players, which will be also called the system with N agents.
Limiting system
The limiting deterministic evolution, the mean field limit, is described by the so called Smoluchovski equation. For every x in the compact subset S ⊂ ℓ 1 the ODE for the component i iṡ
Notation 2 X(t, x, b) is the flow at time t of the ODĖ
starting in x at t = 0 under the control parameter b ∈ E, where f is given by (1.11). In integral form
We view the dynamics given by a deterministic ODE as a Markov process. The semigroup is U t G(x) = G(X(t, x)) (1.14)
for every G ∈ C (S), and its generator is given by 15) for any G ∈ C 1 (S). The first order partial differential operator defined in (1.15) has characteristics which solve equation (1.12).
So, for the limiting ODE given by (1.11), the corresponding infinitesimal generator given by (1.15) is
for any G ∈ C 1 (S) and b ∈ E. We can thus deduce that pointwise convergence of the generators holds. Namely, for the generators of the Markov chains defined by (1.10) and the generator of the deterministic limit defined by (1.16), we obtain
for every G ∈ C 1 (S), x ∈ S and every b ∈ E. We show moreover the convergence in law, for any fixed parameter b ∈ E, of the processes X h to X in the Skorokhod space D([0, T ], S) of cadlag functions, which is the right space where to study these processes. The convergence is then also in probability, as the limit is deterministic, and hence a constant in the Skorokhod space. Proof. Let b ∈ E be fixed. The set C 1 (S) is a dense linear subspace of C (S) and under the assumption of smooth C i j and F i j it is invariant under the limiting semigroup (U t ) defined in (1.14), since the function f defined in (1.11) turns out to be in C 1 (S). So by ( [11] , proposition 17.9) the set C 1 (S) is a core for the generator Λ b defined in (1.16).
Then expanding G in Taylor series we have that
uniformly for every G ∈ C 1 (S). Thus the claim follows from ( [11] , theorem 17.25) which characterizes the convergence of processes in D([0, T ], S).
Controlled systems
Here we deal with the system of small players under some control, i.e. a strategy given by the major player. We assume that this major player focuses in finite horizon time nτ and can update her strategy only in discrete times
τ > 0 and n ∈ N are fixed, and in each time step the controller can change the control parameter b regarding what has happened in the time interval. The starting point of the Markov chain is x 0 = x(h) ∈ hZ f in , with the control parameter b 0 . After the first time step the Markov chain is in the state x 1 = X h (τ, x 0 , b 0 ). Now the major player can change the parameter, so it becomes b 1 = b 1 (x 1 ) that may depend on the current state of the system. She repeats the same procedure at each time step and therefore, in the end, we get what is called a policy.
Notation 3 A policy is a sequence of decision rules
that specify the action of the mayor player at each time step, with
Let X h π (t, x 0 ) denote the state of the system at time t when the controller applies policy π, starting from the initial point x 0 . To shorten the notation we shall sometimes write X h π (t) instead of X h π (t, x 0 ). It is called the controlled system of small players. Equation (1.21) can be also written as x k = X h π (kτ). At each time step kτ the controller has an instantaneous reward B(x k , b k ) and in the end she has a final reward V 0 (x n ). Our goal is to find a strategy that maximizes
where B and V 0 are given continuous functions. It is called the value for the system with N players. The maximum over all possible policies is then the optimal value for the system with N agents
We may want to find this optimum value via the usual dynamic programming method. First of all we define the Shapley operator
and then by backward recurrence
However this procedure might be unfeasible to calculate practically when the number of players increases. So we will consider the optimum of the limit and then study how close these optima are.
Controlled limiting system
We want to study the mean field limit system, given by equation (1.11), in a classical control theory setup. Recall that (E, d) is a compact metric space, the one where the parameter b lies.
Notation 4
We define an action function to be a piecewise Lipschitz function from finite horizon time to E α :
We note that an action function is different from a policy, because the latter depends on the state of the system at each step, while the former does not. Thus in this context we rewrite equation (1.12) where f is defined in (1.11) aṡ x = f (x, α), (1.27) meaningẋ(t) = f (x(t), α(t)) for every t ≥ 0, considering hence b = α(t), i.e. the control parameter is a function of the time.
Notation 5 X(t, x, α) is the flux of the ODE (1.27), i.e. the solution at time t that is in x at t = 0 under the control parameter b = α = α(s). In integral form
We are in a finite horizon time T and now we want to maximize
where B and V 0 are the same as in (1.22) . This is the value of the limiting system. The optimal value is then
Our aim is to study how and under what assumptions we have the convergence of the optimum of the system of small players (1.23) to this optimum (1.30). In fact we want both h and τ tend to 0. To achieve this goal we need further auxiliary systems, to get also the convergence for every policy and every action function.
Stability of S
We show that the state space S := B + (L, R] is stable for all the dynamics considered. We need some regularity for the functions involved in the model. We require that all the functions C i j (x, b) and F i j (x, b) are positive and in C 2 (S) in the variable x, for any b, i.e. twice continuously differentiable on the compact subspace S ⊂ ℓ 1 , in the topology of ℓ 1 . Since S is convex we can take the directional derivatives in every direction, so we have
These constants are all finite as S is compact. Let us recall that L is the identity, i.e. L(k) = k. Therefore, using the above equalities in (1.11) we get that also f : S → ℓ 1 is twice continuously differentiable (in C 2 (S)) as a map both in ℓ 1 and in ℓ 1 (L) with the following bounds
We recall now some fact about ODEs in Banach space of measures. In the Markovian dynamics of the system of small players every state represents the number of coalitions of different sizes, which is of course positive. Hence we are interested in an evolution f : S −→ ℓ 1 for the dynamic (1.12)ẋ = f (x) that preserves positivity, i.e. such that for any initial point x ∈ ℓ 1 + the solution X(t, x) belongs to ℓ 1 + for any t ≥ 0. We say that f must be conditionally positive, in the following sense:
Further, we need the following definitions.
As a motivation, we observe that
for some constant a and b, for all x ∈ ℓ 1 + .
The main result concerning the dynamics in ℓ 1 is the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Assume that the function f is conditionally positive, satisfies the Lyapunov condition and is Lypschitz continuous in the norm of ℓ 1 (L) on any bounded set of ℓ 1 (L) + . Then for any x ∈ ℓ 1 (L) + the Cauchy problem (1.12) has a unique global (defined for all times) solution X(t,
Proof. By local Lipschitz continuity and conditional positivity, evolution (1.12) is locally well-posed and preserves positivity. Moreover, by the Lyapunov condition,
is the duality between functions and measures. So by Gronwall's lemma and the preservation of positivity
implying that the solution can be extended to all times with required bounds.
We have found that, if the assumptions of the lemma are satisfied, the set B + (L, x 0 ] is invariant under an L-subcritical evolution f and the ODE has a unique global solution, starting from x 0 .
Let us check that the assumptions of lemma 2 are satisfied for f defined in (1.11). The function f is conditionally positive because its domain is S, which is a subset of ℓ 1 + , and the functions C i j (x, b) and F i j (x, b) are positive. Further, if we consider the function G ∈ C 1 (S) defined by G(x) = ||x|| ℓ 1 (L) = ∑ k kx k and apply the generator (1.16) to this function then we have ∑ k k f k (x) = 0, since the derivatives of G are
Considering equation (1.37) and thanks to the boundedness of S in ℓ 1 (L) we obtain that f is Lipschitz continuous as a map in ℓ 1 (L). So all the assumptions of lemma 2 are satisfied, showing the well posedness of the problem and the invariance of S. We would like this set to be invariant also for the system of small players.
State space for the small players
The Markov chains X h (t, x(h)) are L-non increasing and have bounded generators. In fact the state space of the coalitions of small players is actually finite for any fixed h. Indeed we recall that if X h (t, x) is in the state x then x k is h times the number of coalitions of size k. The total number of small players is fixed N = N(h) for any h, so x k = 0 for any k ≥ N and x k ≤ N/h for any k ≤ N, meaning that the state space is finite.
The total number of small players N is of course constant. So the norm in ℓ 1 (L) of the states x of the Markov chain X h (t) is conserved:
( So we can define S := B + (L, R] for a suitable R such that this set contains all the initial data x(h) and x 0 . Such an R exists because we will consider lim h→0 x(h) = x 0 and then the sequence is bounded. S is the compact set in ℓ 1 invariant for all the dynamics considered. Thanks to (1.43) we have
for any h. Further lim h→0 M(h) = lim h→0 N(h) = +∞ and the finite spaces S(h) are decreasing, i.e. if h > l then S(h) ⊂ S(l), and h>0 S(h) ⊆ S. Moreover
(1.45)
Assumptions in the model
Let us summarize the assumptions we make on our model. Recall that in the system of N small players the controller acts at time steps kτ for k = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1.
•
• (H5) The horizon T is fixed and the number of steps is
for any h, which tends to infinity, as h tends to 0; • (H6) The rescaling parameter h of the model is such that
Equivalently, we can think of studying the limit as N tends to infinity. So the parameter h = h(N) has to satisfy the latter conditions and it represents the rescaling parameter for the system of N players.
Mean field convergence
In this section we present our main results. We follow the ideas in [8] , hence we firstly introduce the two auxiliary systems.
First auxiliary system
This is a system with N agents controlled by an action function borrowed from the mean field limit. More precisely, let α be an action function that specifies the action to be taken at time t. Although α has been defined for the limiting system, it can also be used for the system with N players. In this case, the action function α can be seen as a policy that does not depend on the state of the system. At step k, the controller applies action
so (1.20) gives a policy (α 0 , . . . , α n−1 ) as in (1.19), but independent of the state of the system. By abuse of notation, we denote by X h α (t) as in (3) the state of the system at time t when applying the policy derived from the action function α as explained above. In what follows policies will always be denoted by π and action functions by α. Here (1.21) becomes
starting from initial point x 0 with control parameter α 0 = α(0). The value for this system, similarly to (1.22) , is defined by
Second auxiliary system
The method of proof uses a second auxiliary system in which trajectories are considered. This is a limiting system controlled by an action function derived from the policy of the original system with N agents. Consider the system with N players under policy π. The stochastic process X h π = X h π,n(h) is defined on some probability space Ω . To every ω ∈ Ω there corresponds a trajectory X h π (ω), and for every ω ∈ Ω we define the piecewise constant action function A h π (ω), as explained in the following
is an action function such that
• this random function is constant on each interval [kτ, (k + 1)τ[ for any k = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1;
) is the action taken by the major player of the system with N agents at time slot kτ, under policy π.
Recall from notation 5 that for any x 0 ∈ S ⊂ ℓ 1 (N) and any action function α, X(x 0 , α) is the solution of the ODE (1.27). For every ω, X(t, x 0 , A h π (ω)) is the solution of the limiting system with action function A h π (ω), as in (1.28), i.e.
The value function for this system is as in (1.29). When ω is fixed, X(t, x 0 , A h π (ω)) is a continuous time deterministic process corresponding to one trajectory X h π (ω). When considering all possible realizations of X h π , X(t, x 0 , A h π ) is a random, continuous time function coupled to X h π , i.e. a stochastic process. Its randomness comes only from the action term A h π , in the ODE (1.27). In the following we omit the dependence on ω in our writing. A h π and X h π will always designate the processes corresponding to the same ω.
Main results
The main result establishes the convergence of the optimization problem for the system with N players to the optimization problem for the mean field limit, through their value functions.
Theorem 1. Under assumptions (H1)-(H6)
, if lim h→0 x(h) = x 0 almost surely, respectively in probability, then
almost surely, respectively in probability, where V h and v are the optimal values defined in (1.23) and (1.30).
The second result states that an optimal action function for the mean field limit provides an asymptotically optimal strategy for the system with N agents. Let us denote by (X h α (t)) t≥0 the continuous time process which is the affine interpolation of X h α (t) (the first auxiliary system) in the points kτ and similarly byX h π (t) the affine interpolation of X h π (t) under policy π. 
Inequality (1.52) implies also that if
almost surely, respectively in probability, then
almost surely, respectively in probability.
The following corollary combines Theorems 1 and 2. It states that an optimal action function for the limiting system is asymptotically optimal for the system of small players.
Corollary 1.
If α * is an optimal action function for the limiting system and if lim h→0 X h (0) = x 0 almost surely, respectively in probability, then
Proof. The assumption says that there exists an action function α * that maximizes
So, if (1.53) holds, the first modulus goes to 0 by (1.54) and the second by (1.50). Therefore (1.55) is given combining Theorems 1 and 2.
Auxiliary results
In order to prove the main theorems we need two auxiliary results.
Theorem 3. Under assumptions (H1)-(H6)
, there exist functions I 0 and J satisfying lim h→0 I 0 (h, α) = lim h→0 J(h, T ) = 0 such that for any ε > 0, h > 0 and any policy π
If (1.53) holds this theorem shows the convergence in probability of the controlled system with N agents, with explicit bounds.
The second statement deals with the convergence of the value for the controlled system of small players to the value of the second auxiliary system. Let π be a policy and A h π be the sequence of actions corresponding to a trajectory of X h π , as in notation 7. Equation (1.29) defines the value for the deterministic limit, whereas α is an action function. When applying the random action function A h π , this defines a random variable v A h π (x 0 ). A consequence of Theorem 3 is the convergence of V h π (X h (0)) to the expectation of this random variable. 
This implies that if (1.53) holds almost surely, respectively in probability, then
almost surely, respectively in probability. The proofs of the main results use the two auxiliary systems. The first auxiliary system provides a strategy for the system with N agents derived from an action function of the mean field limit. It can not do better than the optimal value of the system of small players and it is close to the optimal value of the mean field limit. Therefore the optimal value for the system with N players is lower bounded by the optimal value for the mean field limit.
The second auxiliary system is used in the opposite direction: it shows that for large N the two optimal values are the same.
Requirements for convergence
Let us denote by ||x|| the ℓ 2 -norm of x and define the drift of the model as
Due to Theorems 2-6 in [8] , in order to prove Theorems 1-4 it is sufficient to show that
• (A1) There exist some non random functions I 1 (h) and I 2 (h) such that
and that for all x and all policies π the number coalitions ∆ h π (k) that perform a transition between time step kτ and (k + 1)τ satisfies
• (A2) There exist a function I 0 (h) such that lim h→0 I 0 (h) = 0 and
for every x ∈ S and b ∈ E where the function f is the one in (1.11), and moreover f is defined on S × E and there exists a constant L 2 such that
(1.64)
• (A3) There exist constants L 1 , K and K B such that for all x, y ∈ S and a, b ∈ E
and the reward is bounded:
We will show in the next section that if our assumptions (H1)-(H3) are satisfied then (A1)-(A3) hold.
Let us now fix the functions appearing in (A1), (A2) and (A3):
where
Clearly
Hence L 1 is tends to the constant K by (H4), as h tends to 0. Let us define the functions I ′ 0 , J, B, B ′ appearing in the statements of Theorems 2-4 by the following equations
∞ J(h, T ) B(h, δ ) = 0.
Constructing an optimal policy
By means of corollary 1, an optimal action function for the mean field limit is asymptotically optimal for the system of small players. This provides a way for constructing an asymptotically optimal policy. We denote by u(x,t) the optimal cost over horizon [t, T ] for the limiting system. Under our hypothesis, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 2. The value function u(x,t) is the unique, bounded and uniformly continuous, viscosity solution in S ×
which satisfies the terminal condition u(x, T ) = V 0 (x).
Let us recall that the definition of viscosity solution in a Hilbert space, as ℓ 2 , does not differ from the usual one. Further, under our assumptions, the Hamiltonian defined as H(x, p) := max b∈E {p · f (x, b) + B(x, b)} for any (x, p) ∈ S × ℓ 2 is such that
where C is a constant. Therefore existence and uniqueness of bounded and uniformly continuous viscosity solutions to (1.80) are implied by Theorem 5.1 in [6] .
We state the algorithm presented in [8] for constructing an asymptotically optimal policy for the system of small players X h via an optimal action function for the mean field limit X:
• Let X h (0) be the initial condition of the limiting system. Solve the HamiltonJacobi-Bellman equation (1.80) on [0, τn(h)]. Assume this provides an optimal control function α * ;
• Construct a policy π for the system of small players: the action to be taken under state
The asymptotic optimality of the related value is ensured by corollary 1. The policy π constructed above is static in the sense that it does not depend on the state X h (kτ) but only on the initial state X h (0). The deterministic estimation of X h (kτ) is provided by the differential equation.
The algorithm described above uses an optimal action function for the limiting system which may not exist, as we observed above. A sufficient condition for its existence is that the set f (x, E) × B(x, E) is convex for all x ∈ S; a proof of this fact can be found in [1] .
However the existence of an optimal action function is actually not necessary in the algorithm described above. Indeed, if there is no optimal control of the HJB equation (1.80), one can replace the optimal α * used in the algorithm by an action function which is h-optimal. This still provides an asymptotically optimal policy.
Example
We show here that in a class of applications the limiting problem can be reduced to an optimization problem in one dimension. This provides a computationally much more effective scheme in order to obtain an asymptotically optimal policy for the system of small players, in view of the algorithm presented above.
Firstly, we study a particular case in which the mean field limit admits an explicit solution. So let us consider E = [0, 1] and a particular shape of the functions C i j and F i j , in which the there is no dependence on x:
In particular if b is 1 then only merging is possible. While if it is 0 only splitting is possible. Let m(x) := ∑ i x i be the norm of x ∈ ℓ 1 . With these rates the limiting evolution f in (1.11) can be studied considering only the dynamics of the norm. Evaluating the limiting generator (1.16) on G = m we obtain
Hence the evolution of m is described by We assume that there is no instantaneous reward and that the final reward V 0 = V 0 (m) is a strictly concave function of m which has a unique maximum in m * . The value function V in this case can be computed explicitely, that is 
(1.88)
This example can be generalized to the case in which the rates C i j and F i j depend also on the norm of x. Namely, let
(1.89)
where f C and f B are some Lipschitz continuous and non-negative functions. The dynamics (1.84) for m becomes
Also in this case, the mean field limiting problem reduces to an optimization problem in one dimension. Thus there are numerical schemes which provide an 1 N -optimal action function in feedback form (see e.g. [1] ). These are much more efficient than trying to solve the Bellman equation (1.26). In fact the prelimit problem is allowed to be tackled when N is lower than a few tens: see [20] .
Proofs of convergence
In this section we show that (A1)-(A3) hold in our fragmentation-coagulation model. So (H1)-(H6) hold and recall that the compact state space S ⊂ ℓ 1 is stable for all the dynamics considered.
Lipschitz continuity of the limit
We verify that (1.66) and (1.64) are satisfied for the function f in (1.11), if (H2) holds. We actually do not need f to be in C 2 (S), but only in C 1 (S). We use the fact that
for any x ∈ S. So equation (1.34) gives
for all x ∈ S, which is the assumption (1.64) with bound
By (1.92) and its definition (1.2) we get also
which, together with equation (1.36), yields
Applying then the mean value theorem in the convex space S, for every x and y in S there exist a point z in the segment [x, y] such that
Thus taking the ℓ 2 -norm and using the fact that D f is a bounded linear map we get
for all x and y in S. According to (1.94) we find that the limiting function is Lipschitz continuous in x, for the ℓ 2 -norm with
as a Lipschitz constant. Clearly (H3) implies (1.67), (1.68) and (1.69).
Convergence of the drift
Here we prove (1.63). Recall that the drift of the model is
The semigroup U h t of the Markov process X h is defined by
for any G ∈ C (S, R) and t ≥ 0. U 0 is the identity and U t satisfies the Kolmogorov differential equation
where Λ h,b is the infinitesimal generator defined in (1.10).
We apply U h t to the projection on the k-th coordinate G k . This function is in C (S, R) and x, b) . The Taylor formula applied to u k in the variable t gives
for a fixed s ∈]0, τ[ and for every x and b. We have
and according to (1.96)
for every x and b. The generator (1.10) calculated on the projection, using G k (e i ) = δ ik , gives
and, observing that C i j = C ji and F i j = F i,i− j , the latter expression is exactly
for every x and b.
We need also an estimate of the latter term in (1.98). Equation (1.96) yields
We use then the fact that the semigroup U h s is, for any s, a contraction in the space C (S, R) equipped with the sup-norm ||G|| ∞ := sup x∈S |G(x)|. Thus the latter term in (1.98) is bounded by
for any x ∈ S, b ∈ E and s > 0.
The estimate for the norm of Λ b,h f k is found applying again the Taylor formula to f k :
for certain fixed points y and z in S. This gives, using the estimates (1.31), (1.36) and (1.38) and the definitions of the norms of the derivatives D f and
for every x ∈ S and b ∈ E and k = 1, . . . , N(h).
for every x ∈ S and b ∈ E and k = 1, . . . , N(h), where R 1 := 3(CR 2 + FR)(6CR + 3F + 3C(1)R 2 + F(1)R) and R 2 := 54(CR 2 + FR)(C + F(1) + C(1)R + F(1)R + C(2)R 2 ). Equations (1.97) and (1.98), by means of (1.99), (1.100) and (1.101), lead to
and this applying (1.102) and (1.103) yields
for any k = 1, . . . , N(h). Considering the ℓ 2 -norm we have hence
which is (1.63), whereas I 0 is given by (1.72).
Lipschitz continuity of the drift
Here we verify that the drift F h of the model is Lipschitz continuous and we also find a constant for which it is bounded in ℓ 2 . We use two tools. The first is the fact that the process
are martingales with respect to the filtration generated by the Markov process X(t) t≥0 , for every G in the domain of its generator. While the second tool is the notion of coupling for Markov chains. We want to study the behavior of the two Markov chains X h (t, x, b) and X h (t, y, b) for x = y and link them in some sense in the product space. So we could define a coupling of these stochastic processes in terms of their distributions in the space of paths D([0, T ], S), the space of cadlag functions, for fixed initial points. However, for given marginal Markov processes, the resulting coupled process may not be Markovian. So we introduce the following fundamental definition, which can be found for instance in [3] . Definition 4. Given two Markov processes with semigroups U j (t) and generators Λ j , or transition probabilities P j (t, x 1 , ·), on (E j , E j ), j = 1, 2, a Markovian coupling is a Markov process with semigroupŨ(t) and generatorΛ , or transition probabilitỹ P(t; x 1 , x 2 , ·), on the product space (E 1 × E 2 , E 1 ⊗ E 2 ) having the marginality:
Or equivalentlỹ
where B(E ) is the set of all bounded E -measurable functions. Here on the left hand side G is regarded as a bivariate function, although it depends on only one variable.
for any t ≥ 0 and g ∈ C (S(h) × S(h)). Considering g k (x, y) := x k − y k and G k (x) = x, by means of definition 4 and identity (1.101), we havẽ
by definition (1.60) of the drift. Hence equation (1.106) yields
which, taking the ℓ 2 -norm and applying Fubini's theorem and the Lipschitz continuity of f (1.66), becomes
for any coupling operatorΛ h , where K is defined in (1.95). Now we need the following lemma, which is stated for instance in [4] :
Lemma 3. Let U t be a strongly continuous semigroup on E with generator Λ whose domain is D, α ∈ R be a constant and f ∈ D. Then U t f ≤ e αt f if and only if
Thus by Gronwall's lemma
(⇒) Let U t f ≤ e αt f , then by definition of the generator
Hence we want to apply this lemma to the coupling operatorΛ h and the function ρ(x, y) = ||x − y||, in order to obtain an upper bound of the right hand side in (1.107). So we have to choose a particular coupling for which there exists α ∈ R such that the condition
is satisfied. We use the so called coupling of marching soldiers, introduced by Chen in 1986 and whose description can be found for instance in [3] . This gives a Markov chain in S(h) × S(h) such that, if it is in (x, y), it jumps to
• (x + z, y + z) at rate min{q(x, x + z), q(y, y + z)},
for any z ∈ S(h), where q(x, y) are the rates, i.e. the elements of the Q-matrix, of the Markov chain X h . It is a Markov coupling, i.e. it satisfies definition 4 part 2, since min{a, b} + (a − b) + = a for any a, b ≥ 0. Set h i j = −he i − he j + he i+ j and h i j = −he i + he j + he i− j . Thus the generator of the marching couplingΛ of the Markov chain X h , whose generator is defined in (1.10), is given bỹ Hence from (1.114), by means of (1.64), we get also an upper bound for the drift:
for every x ∈ S(h) and b ∈ E, where L 2 is defined in (1.93).
Bounds for ∆
We find an estimate for E(∆ h π (k)|X h π = x) where ∆ h π (k) is the number of coalitions that perform a transition between time step kτ and (k + 1)τ. Because of Markovianity the above expectation is independent of k, so we can suppose k = 0. Hence we consider E(∆ h |X h (0) = x 0 ), where ∆ h is the number of coalitions that change their state between 0 and τ.
If the system is in x 0 in t = 0 there is an exponential clock of parameter s(x 0 , b) such that, when it clicks, the system changes its state, say it goes in x 1 . Now there is an other exponential clock of parameter s(x 1 , b) such that, when it clicks, the system changes its state, say it goes in x 2 . We repeat this procedure until we arrive at time τ. Note that ∆ h is then less or equal than the number of clicks that we get from 0 to τ.
Thus to estimate ∆ h we take an upper bound of s(x, b) defined in (1. Hence for any x ∈ S(h) and b ∈ E, s(x, b) is bounded by a constant s h that depends only on h:
(1.116) For a constant s the number of occurrences of clicks is known to be a Poisson process of intensity s. Thus for a constant s the number of clicks from 0 to τ is a random variable X with Poisson distribution of parameter sτ. This implies in particulat that E(X) = sτ and E(X 2 ) = sτ(1 + sτ).
Hence the expectations for ∆ h are bounded by
for any x 0 ∈ S(h). Using (1.116) we find
and
Therefore (1.61) and (1.62) hold with the bounds specified in (1.73) and (1.74).
